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DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION: AN ENDURING
RELATIONSHIP?
JOEL COLON-RIOst AND ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON"
"[F]or in a rebellion, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent
is the end."
-Alexis

de Tocqueville'

Democracy and revolution are juxtaposed in history and its academic commentary. As a general rule, they are considered to be unrelated and
occasionally antagonistic practices. But this is a far too sweeping and
misleading statement. While there are some revolutions that bear little
connection to democratic motives or aspirations, there are others that are
done in the service of a democratic impulse. These democratic revolutions bear little resemblance to the coup d'itats that tend to replace one
elite with another. There is a world of difference between those political
transformations that usher in a more democratic regime and those that do
not. Whereas one occurs under conditions of popular participation and
support, the other does not. In short, not all revolutionary struggles are
the same in terms of their democratic legitimacy.
In this Article, we take the view that, as understood from a thoroughly democratic standpoint, certain revolutions can be seen as part and
parcel of a vigorous democratic culture and sensibility. Indeed, we contend that a democratic revolution can not only occur in cases in which a
popular majority succeeds in overthrowing the established constitutional
order illegally (that is, without recourse to the constitutionally recognized
rule of change) but also when challengers self-consciously adopt and use
constitutionalmeans to transform the state. For us, there is no sharp or
enduring distinction between some revolutions and constitutional changes: a robust democracy will incorporate constitutional means by which to
facilitate periodic revolutions. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, there is no
need in a true democracy to invent the end of revolution as it becomes a
continuing and integral part of democratic arrangements themselves.2
This Article is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to
explaining how democratic revolutions can be profitably understood as

t Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
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I.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE RECOLLECTIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 56 (J.P.
Mayer ed., Alexander Teixeira de Mattos trans., Meridian Books, Inc., 1959) (1896).
2.
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 1, at 64.
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exercises of constituent power unmediated by any particular way of proceeding; reference will be made to contemporary developments in global
politics. The second part contends that the democratic legitimacy of a
revolution does not depend only on whether it was supported by citizens
or on whether the regime it creates governs in the name of the citizenry,
but also on whether it attempts to re-produce its democratic impulse
through a weak constitutional order that provides participatory procedures for its own transformation. Finally, in the third part, we defend the
radical proposal that an unconditional commitment to democracy would
require that revolutionary-initiated constitutions leave the door open for
future exercises of constituent power or, what is the same thing, for future democratic revolutions. Throughout, we develop and stand by an
account of democracy as both a theory and a practice that re-orders the
traditional relationship between popular sovereignty and constitutional
supremacy.
I. REVOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUENT POWER

A usual starting-point for an analysis of revolutions is Hans
Kelsen's work.3 Kelsen was interested in legal revolutions. His focus
was on changes in the constitutional regime that could not be legally
justified; these were situations in which an "order in force is overthrown
and replaced by a new order in a way which the former had not itself
anticipated." Most importantly, Kelsen's account of legal revolutions
does not involve an inquiry into the political morality of the historical
facts and forces that brought about the founding of a new legal system.
Kelsen was not concerned with whether the revolutionaries had just
cause or were driven by a genuinely democratic impulse. On the contrary, since according to Kelsen, norms can only derive their validity from
other norms, his attention to the ultimate origins of the legal system was
only directed at explaining the "objective" validity of the revolutionary
constitution.. Put differently, he was not interested in examining the
democratic character of the constitution-making act that brought the revolutionary constitution into existence. From the perspective of his pure
theory of law, it is simply irrelevant if a new and effective constitution
was posited "by an individual usurper or by some kind of assembly." 6

3. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg
trans., 1945) [hereinafter KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY]; see also generally HANS KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cali. Press 1967) (1934) [hereinafter KELSEN, PURE
THEORY].
4.
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supranote 3, at 117.

5. Id. at 116-17 (looking at the origins of the legal system not to determine whether those
origins were consistent with any moral or political principles, but in order to explain why a constitution adopted in violation of the established rules of constitutional change can be seen as resting on a
higher norm (i.e. the newly presupposed basic norm that accompanies a successful revolution)).
6. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supranote 3, at 115.
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While Kelsen's theory allows a better understanding of the relationship between revolutions and constitutions as well as that between lawful
and unlawful constitutional change, it is not intended to provide the tools
needed to distinguish between a democratic re-constitution and a military
coup d'dtat.7 Consequently, instead of looking at Kelsen's pure theory of
law for understanding revolutions, democrats might be better advised to
consult the theory of constituent power, developed during the American
and French Revolutions. Constituent power, as will be seen below, is the
power to create new constitutions or the source of the production of fundamental juridical norms. In its modern formulation, constituent power is
always considered to rest with the people who possess a legally unlimited faculty to give themselves any constitution they want. In that sense,
the theory of constituent power is particularly concerned with the identity
of the creator of the constitution and with the constitution-making process. As such, it is much more palatable and appealing to the democrat
than a Kelsenian pure theory.
Although receiving its first major theoretical formulation in France,
the concept of constituent power was already present in revolutionary
North America. "[T]he people . . ." wrote Thomas Young in 1777 in a

letter to the citizens of Vermont, "are the supreme constituent power and,
of course, their immediate [r]epresentatives are the supreme [d]elegate
power." 8 Similarly, but at the eve of the revolution in France, Emmanuel
Sieyes wrote that the constitution was not "the creation of the constituted
power, but of the constituent power," and that the bearer of the constitu9
ent power was "the source and the supreme master of positive law." In
this line of thinking, a political community could not be permanently
subject to any constitution; the constituent power always remained free
to unbind itself from the established constitutional regime and create a
new juridical order. It is a view that places democratic legitimacy ahead
of theoretical purity.
But Sieyes combined his theory of constituent power with a strong
commitment to the principle of representation. He explicitly rejected
more participatory forms of democracy and even suggested that members
7.

This does not mean,. however, that Kelsen was uninterested in democracy. See Hans

Kelsen, On the Essence and Value of Democracy, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 84, 84-

85 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000).
8. Letter from Dr. Young to the Inhabitants of Vermont (April 11, 1777), in RECORDS OF
THE COUNCIL OF SAFETY AND GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VERMONT (E.P. Walton

ed., 1873); see also Joel Colon-Rios, The Legitimacy of the Juridical:ConstituentPower, Democracy, and the Limits of ConstitutionalReform, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 199, 199 (2010) (presenting a
contemporary discussion of the theory of constituent power and its connections to democracy and
democratic legitimacy).
9.

EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 124, 128 (1963). Sieyes's

theory is not an invitation to continuous revolutionary activity. In fact, it can be said that Sieyes saw
that one of the fundamental tasks of politics was that of ensuring that a situation of unbinding, an
exercise of constituent power, does not occur once a constitutional order is in place. MARTIN
LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAw 63 (2003).
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of the ordinary legislative assembly could transform themselves into a
constituent body. He thus maintained that "[t]he people, I repeat, in a
country which is not a democracy (and France would not be one), the
people may only speak and may only act through its representatives."'o
Of course, Sieyes's ideas did not carry the day for everyone.
A prominent critic was Carl Schmitt, the controversial German jurist, who rejected this aspect of Sieyes's thought." Schmitt insisted that
the constituent power of the people could not be effectively represented.
He stressed that constituent power could not be reduced to any specific
forms or procedures. This is why he had a critical attitude towards the
French Revolution. In particular, he disagreed with the decision of the
National Constituent Assembly of not submitting the Constitution of
1791 to popular ratification and of adopting instead the Sieyesean view
of a "represented" constituent power. "It would have been consistently
democratic," wrote Schmitt, "to let the people itself decide, for the [constituent] will of the people cannot be represented without democracy
transforming itself into an aristocracy. Nonetheless, democracy was not
at issue in 1789. It was, rather, a constitution of a liberal, bourgeois

Rechsstaat."I 2
Despite his democratic rhetoric, Schmitt was far from being a democrat himself. However, his radicalization of the theory of constituent
power provides the basis for a more thoroughly democratic conception of
revolutions. For example, building on Schmitt, Andreas Kalyvas has
argued that from the perspective of constituent power, "phenomena such
as civil disobedience, irregular and informal movements, insurgencies,
and revolutionary upheavals retain all their dignity and significance even
if they directly challenge the existing constitutional structure of power."l 3 In this conception of the relation between democracy and constitutionalism, democracy is something much more earthy and organic than
the purist ambitions of many legal theorists. Its disruptive and unmanageable dimensions are something to be celebrated, not lamented.

10.

Lucien Jaume, Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and Its Consequences, in

THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 67, 80

(Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). In fact, Sieyes opposed democracy to the idea of
representation: where representation was necessary, like in France, there could not be a democracy:
'No aristocracy' ought to become a kind of rallying-cry for all the friends of the nation and good
order. The aristocrats will think that they can resort by crying: 'No democracy'. But we will repeat
'No democracy' with them and againstthem. These gentlemen do not realize that representatives are
not democrats; that since real democracy is impossible amongst such a large population, it is foolish
to presume it or to appear to fear it . . . ." SIEYES, supra note 9, at 196; see also RAYMOND CARRE
DE MALBERG, TEORIA GENERAL DEL ESTADO 1165 (1948) (arguing that through the introduction of
the principle of representation, Sieves weakened the scope of his system of popular sovereignty).
11.
See CARL SCHMirr, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 128, 132 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,
Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928).
12. Id. at 128 (citation omitted).
13.
Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12
CONSTELLATIONS 223, 230 (2005).
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It is not surprising, therefore, that many contemporary scholars of
constitutionalism have worked to contain the unsettling impact of constituent power in both theory and practice. The very term constituent
power has almost entirely disappeared from even the most populist approaches to constitutional change. 14 When mentioned, it is only to be
discarded as an undesirable political concept. For instance, in the sequel
to We the People, Bruce Ackerman identified constituent power as an
arbitrary will that manifests itself in acts of upheaval in which "law ends,
and pure politics (or war) begins."' In distancing his theory of dualist
democracy from the idea of constituent power, he describes constituent
power as a lawless activity; it takes place during a political crisis in
which an arbitrary will that fails to respect the constitution triumphs over
the existent constitutional regime. 16 However, it is worth noting that,
even though Ackerman's recommended constitutional politics do not
involve the "sheer acts of will" that allegedly characterize constituent
power, his celebrated revolutionaries (e.g., the Founding Federalists, the
Reconstruction Republicans, and the New Deal Democrats) failed to
follow the established rules for constitutional change, even if they "expepowerful institutional constraints on their revisionary authoririenced
17
ty-"
In an earlier vein, Hannah Arendt shared similar concerns, maintaining that a juridical order could never achieve sufficient stability if it
was conceived as originating in the ever-changing will of a disorganized
multitude. She maintained that any structure built on the will of the multitude as its foundation "is built on quicksand."' 8 Although these scholars
are writing in a much later era, it is likely that those were the types of
concerns that drove North American and French revolutionaries to close
the doors of their constitutions for any future exercises of constituent
power. The well-known North American debate between James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson provides the classical example.
Madison reacted against Jefferson's insistence in periodic constituent assemblies designed to allow the people to exercise its "right to
choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its
own happiness."' 9 For Madison, Jefferson's proposal suggested to the
citizenry that their current system of government was somehow defec14. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994) (highlighting how the government may enact change
without actually going to the people); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT

IT) 18 (2006).
15.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998).

16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18.

HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 163 (Penguin Books 1977) (1963).

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE
19.
THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 560 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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tive, depriving the government of "that veneration which time bestows
on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."2 0 Instead of periodic
assemblies that, by opening the Constitution to the "decisions of the
whole society" interested "too strongly the public passions,"2 1 Madison
favored a complicated amendment procedure. That is, a process that involved a series of extraordinary majorities at the federal and state levels,
and this made even minor constitutional changes difficult to propose and
unlikely to succeed. Justice John Marshall provided judicial support to
this approach when he declared that, while "the people have an original
right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness .... [t]he exercise of
this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be
frequently repeated." 2 2 He went on to add that, since "the authority from
which they proceed ... can seldom act, [these principles] are designed to
be permanent." 23
Even in France, where the theory of constituent power was onginally voiced, there was a conscious attempt to prevent constituent
power's future exercise and relevancy. In the very last article of the
French Constitution of 1791, this approach received a concise legal formulation: "The National Assembly, having heard the reading of the
above Constitutional Act, and having approved it, declares that the Constitution is completed and that nothing may be altered therein."24 Probably in a similar mood, Isaac Le Chapelier, the French eighteenth century
jurist and member of the National Constituent Assembly, claimed that
"[t]he revolution [was] finished" because there were "no more injustices

20. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
21.
Id. at 315.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
23. Id.
24. 1791 CONST. VII. The French Constitution of 1791 also contained a complicated amendment provision, which is prefaced by the following statement:
The National Constituent Assembly declares that the nation has the imprescriptible right
to change its Constitution; nevertheless, considering that it is more in conformity with the
national interest to use only the right of reforming, by the means provided in the Constitution itself, those articles which experience has proven unsatisfactory, decrees that it
shall be effected by an Assembly of Revision in the following form.
Id See Denis Baranger, The Language of Eternity: ConstitutionalReview of the Amending Power in
France (or the Absence Thereof), ISR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (describing how contemporary
French constitutional theory generally sees constituent power as susceptible of being exercised by
the ordinary legislative assembly). A similar approach is found in John Locke's draft constitution for
the Carolinas, which stated, "These fundamental constitutions . .. shall be and remain the sacred and
unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever." The Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolinas,THE AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/ncG5.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). See also THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA Dec. I1, 1969, art.
37 ("The present constitutional proclamation shall be in effect until a permanent constitution is
issued. It will be amended by the Revolutionary Command Council only in case of necessity and in
the interest of the Revolution.").
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to overcome, or prejudices to contend with."25 Some years later, Napoleon echoed this view and with characteristic bombast declaimed that "Citizens, the revolution is determined by the principles that began it. The
constitution is founded on the sacred rights of property, equality, freedom. The revolution is over.",26
These fabled exchanges set the stage for contemporary debate and
still manage to dominate it. The exercise of constituent power, of a power that threatens to replace the existing constitutional regime, has been
relegated to the terrain of the exceptional.27 This is hardly unexpected;
the quest for constitutional stability seems to have trumped all other ambitions. Interestingly, democracy has historically been seen as carrying
with it similar risks. For many, the prospect of the mass of ordinary people always getting what they want and continually making and unmaking fundamental laws represents the antithesis of good government;
it is considered to be the rule of persons' ever-changing wishes against
the empire of law and reason. 2 8 Yet the concepts of constituent power
and democracy have a natural affinity: constituent power is not simply a
power to create new juridical orders, but to create them with those who
will be subject to it. The concept of constituent power, in this respect,
points toward a self-determining demos, a populace that adopts the laws
that will regulate their political association. This amounted to what Carl
Friedrich called "the right to revolution,"2 9 which the people could invoke and exercise at will.
Indeed, it is this collective aspect of constituent power that connects
it so intimately and effectively with democracy; they both reinforce each
other in their commitment to the notion that there can and should be
mass, direct, and continuing participation in constitution-making . The
recent events in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate this phe25.

Jaume, supra note 10, at 71 (citations omitted).

26.

ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN STATE 2

(Maurizia Boscagli trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1999) (1992) (referencing Napoleon's statement
made on December 15, 1798). But these sentiments are not only of historical interest. The very same
words find an expressive echo in contemporary constitutional theory. As a prominent political commentator observed, "By making a constitution, the revolutionary forces are digging their own graves;
the constitution is the final act of the revolution." Ulrich Preuss, Constitutional Powermakingfor the
New Polity: Some Deliberationson the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 639, 641 (1993). Similarly, even the fabled John Rawls took the view that the
adoption of a "democratic constitution" should be understood as an expression by the people of a
profound demand to govern itself in a certain way and of fixing, "once and for all," certain constitutional essentials. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 232 (expanded ed. 2005).
See generally ANDREAS KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE
27.
EXTRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT, AND HANNAH ARENDT (2008) (providing an
excellent discussion of the relationship between constituent power and the exception).
See JEAN BODIN, SIx BOOKSOF THE COMMONWEALTH 193 (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955); see
28.
also ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 257 (Fania Oz-Salzberger
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND
29.
PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 129 (Ginn & Co. 1950); see Preuss, supra note 26, at 647; see
also Kalyvas, supra note 13, at 238.
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nomenon. Unorganized throngs of people have come together to demand
political freedom. This has manifested in the rallying-cry Al-sha'b yurid
isquat al-nizam (The people want the downfall of the regime!). 3 0 With
warts and all, this is an undeniable embodiment and manifestation of
constituent power at its most insistent and immediate. These popular
uprisings are reminiscent of Schmitt's view that "[t]he will of the people
to provide themselves a constitution can only be made evident through
the act itself and not through observation of a normatively regulated process." 1 As such, they represent not a step towards democracy, but a feral
exercise of the democratic instinct; they are as much a part of the democratic initiative as more stable and less spontaneous political engagements.
The despotic regimes that have been overthrown (and those which
being challenged by popular movements in the Arab world)
currently
are
denied citizens the traditional liberal protections enshrined in the constitutions founded in the American and French Revolutions (and this is, of
course, part of the reason why they are being overthrown). But, at a different and deeper level, all these societies (i.e., United States, France,
Libya, Egypt, etc.) share a fundamental similarity in constitutional terms.
Like the constitutions established by the American and French revolutionaries, the juridical systems being challenged and overthrown in the
Middle East and Africa lack an opening for constituent power to manifest from time to time. By prioritizing constitutional supremacy over
popular sovereignty and subordinating the latter to the former, these institutional arrangements attempt to avoid future revolutions and democratic re-constitutions. Strong constitutionalism trumps weak democracy.
This prioritization of constitutionalism over other political values
and commitments leaves those who decide to engage in democratic revolutions in an unfortunate position. Once they have exhausted the limited
range of conventional political avenues for change, they have to resort to
the unmediated, disorganized, and occasionally violent exercise of constituent power. And that is part of the reason why the French and American Revolutions are not as democratic as it might otherwise be suggested. Although to varying degrees and with varying consequences, these
upheavals suffer from and share the same democratically-debilitating
tendency to stifle and de-legitimize constituent power as those regimes in

30. Perry Anderson, On the Concatenation in the Arab World, 68 NEW LEFT REv. 5, 9-10
(2011).
SCHMITT, supra note 11, at 131. "Self-evidently", he added, "it can also not be judged by
31.
prior constitutional laws or those that were valid until then." Id. They are also reminiscent of Sheldon Wolin's invitation to embrace democracy's inclinations towards revolution and re-conceive it as
fugitive and episodical in character. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 31, 43 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,

1996). "Democracy," says Wolin, "is a rebellious moment that may assume revolutionary, destructive proportions, or may not." Id.

2012]

DEMOCRACYAND REVOLUTION

601

the Middle East and North Africa.32 Constitutionalism tends to efface,
not simply channel or contain constituent power.
H. LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The prevailing conception among "constitutional democrats"according to which the democratic character of a constitution depends on
its substantive content 33 -allows us to celebrate the democratic features
of the French and American Revolutions, but not to offer a critical assessment of their democratic shortcomings. Yet it is in those shortcomings that the key to assessing the democratic legitimacy of a revolution,
and of the constitution it inaugurates, lies. Put shortly, a revolution, as an
exercise of constituent power, should not be seen as a one-time event, or
as the extraordinary founding of a permanent juridical order that is supported by the citizenry and that purports to permanently govern with
their consent. It is both much more and much less than that.
The dominant conception of revolution, in which a revolution is a
highy exceptional (and usually undesirable) event, is inconsistent with
the idea of the people's constituent power. 34 More pointedly, it is gravely
problematic from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. Most of the
revolutions that would be considered democratic under this approach
generally follow a similar pattern: a movement supported by the people
is successful in transforming the state in a way that was not anticipated
by the extant rules of change of the established constitutional order, and
the new regime replaces the existing constitution with a new one. Moreover, this new constitution protects a set of political and individual freedoms that were not respected by the previous regime. Those political and
individual freedoms would normally take the form of a bill of rights and
underpin a republican form of government. So constituted, the new regime would be showcased as being governed and legitimated by the consent of the people.
This conception, however, does not address the crucial way in
which the constitution established by a successful "democratic revolution" permits or facilitates the possibility of any future exercise of constituent power. That is to say, there is no account taken of whether the
new constitution provides the citizenry with the means of engaging in the
type of constitutional overhaul that the previous regime prohibited and
that made an "illegal" revolution necessary in the first place. The constiSee generally JOEL COLON-RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
32.
THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (2012); ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009).
See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
33.
POLITICAL DEBATE (2006).
The classical formulation of this view is found in Locke, who although defending the
34.
people's right to revolution, limited its exercise to situations of extreme injustice in which the government engaged in a "long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices." JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 433 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963).
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tutional regimes present in modem states are in fact characterized by
institutions designed to ensure that a democratic revolution never occurs.
In that respect, they share the spirit of Isaac Le Chapelier's and Napoleon's dictums-if the constitution established a just and democratic regime, why not protect it from future revolutions? Indeed, why not hinder
rather than facilitate the reemergence of constituent power?
The problem, of course, is that no constitution can establish a permanent, and democratic regime: the very idea of a just, finished constitution that seeks to prevent instances of popular constitutional change is
incompatible with democracy. Instead of treating important constitutional transformations as occasions for establishing more just constitutional
forms and superior mechanisms for democratic engagement, most modern constitutions attempt to regulate their own transformation through
very limited and highly technical mechanisms. They make change difficult and unlikely, even if supported by great majorities of the population.
These amendment rules are driven by an aspiration to consolidate the
permanency of the constitutional regime, not by an urgent impetus to
maintain and preserve the revolutionary spirit that brought the constitutional regime into existence.
For example, take Article V, the amendment rule of the U.S. Constitution." While it was created by a successful revolution, it makes future
changes in the Constitution extremely difficult to effect. Indeed, it is one
of the most demanding constitutional amendment processes in the
world.36 Under Article V, two-thirds of both houses of Congress may
propose amendments or two-thirds of the state legislatures may apply for
a constitutional convention for proposing amendments. These proposals
must then be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures or by threefourths of special state conventions. With such formidable hurdles, it is
not surprising that the U.S. Constitution has been amended only twentyseven times in over two centuries. Moreover, it is equally telling that the
ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment took 200 years to be
completed; it was ratified in 1992, after being originally presented by
James Madison in 1789.37 All told, Article V seems to be less an
amendment rule and more a non-amendment rule.
Again, from a strong democratic viewpoint, Article V not only
makes constitutional amendments almost impossible to adopt, it also
makes their (unlikely) adoption non-participatory; amending the Constitution is left in the exclusive hands of government officials, albeit elected
35.
36.

U.S. CONST. art. V.
See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF

NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, 102 (2009); see also Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT 237, 260 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
37. Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 497, 498 (1992).
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representatives. This is true even when the initiative to propose constitutional changes is not only placed in Congress, but states are provided
with the faculty of applying for a (unprecedented) convention which
would arguably have an unlimited power to propose amendments or even
an entirely new fundamental law. 38 Such a convention, at least in theory,
could be seen as an attempt to reproduce the process through which the
Constitution was established in the first place. Even leaving aside the
difficulties involved in calling a convention (created in part by the supermajority rules in the initiative and ratification processes and by the possibility that Congress might refuse to call it or to send its proposals for
ratification)," there are certain ambiguities in the text of Article V that
make its democratic credentials questionable. For example, would the
members of the convention be democratically elected? If they are elected, would they be elected by the people at large or according to the principle of state quality (e.g., one delegate for each state regardless of the
size of the state's population)? Would the convention have the power to
adopt its own internal rules? Does the convention or Congress have the
power of creating an alternative ratification procedure (such as a binding
national referendum)? Could Congress transform itself into a convention? 40
Of course, the upshot of having a next-to-impossible-to-use
amendment process is not that no changes in constitutional arrangements
happen. On the contrary, it is that change occurs by other, even less democratic means than that provided by the written constitution itself. It is
difficult to identify or imagine any society whose constitution, even if its
form remains the same, remains fixed in substance over any extended
period of time. This is especially the case in common law jurisdictions,
like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. While jurists
and politicians may pay lip-service to a nation's founding and enduring
documents, they know that this is only the beginning of the search for
constitutional meaning. Amendment is simply one kind of change that is
more formal, less technical, and often, although not always, more significant. Changes, even of a large and significant nature, occur even though
the formal process of constitutional change itself remains unused and
unchanged. While there is no simple or fixed causal relation, the informal amendment process is inextricably linked to the formal amendment
38. See Walter E. Dellinger, The RecurringQuestion of the "Limited" ConstitutionalConvention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 (1979) (discussing states calling for a constitutional convention).
39. In fact, according to some interpretations, the number of applications required to call an
Article V Convention was surpassed in 1993, but Congress did not call the Convention. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Casefor a ConstitutionalConvention, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 837, 856 (2011). By 2010, the number of states asking for a Convention had decreased from forty-five to thirty-three (thirty-four being the requisite number of
states). Id at 857-58.
40.
Some of these questions are considered in Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V:
The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96
VA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (2010).
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process in "that an informal amendment process exists because formal
amendment is so difficult."'
In the United States, changes in constitutional law have happened at
a steady and continuous pace. While taking place under the guise of interpretation, there have been some monumental changes in the regime of
constitutional structures and rights. If Brown42 and Roe,43 for example,
are treated as merely interpretive adjustments, then the supposed distinction between interpretation and amendment becomes blurred and unreliable. Constitutional history shows that there is no change that is so big
that it could not be achieved informally (and in spite of the written constitution) if the political forces are sufficiently aligned to demand or facilitate it." It is only when there is insufficient support for change (particularly from the elites) that the formal amendment process will appear
as a brute obstacle to change.45 Otherwise, change will proceed with little
concern for the distinction between legal interpretation and constitutional
amendment and between the formal and informal practices of change.
More importantly, by exploring how such changes have occurred, it
becomes possible to glimpse and uncover the fundamental and operative
assumptions about political power and democratic legitimacy at any
point in history. In particular, the actual institutional levers and location
of such constitutional changes disclose where a society situates the actual
seat of sovereignty and where it locates the actual locus of legitimacy,
regardless of what formal constitutional provisions might suggest or recommend. As regards the United States, this site is most definitely not the
people themselves. It is the courts, especially the Supreme Court, which
have become the preferred site for effecting important changes in the
constitutional order. By design and default, the Court has claimed the
ultimate authority to act on behalf of the American citizenry as a selfgoverning and self-constituting nation: judges have become the filters
and proxies for the citizenry.46

41.
Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to
Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 925, 933 (2007).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Brown v. Bd. of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
45. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevanceof ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1464 (2001). See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE
L.J. 1943, 1984 (2003) and Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitutionfrom the
People: JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 34 (2003), focusing on the
ways social movements and other socio-political forces shape constitutional culture.
46. This approach finds one of its earlier expressions in Marbury, and is also echoed in Ackerman, which seems to attribute the Supreme Court with the ability to speak in the people's name.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803); see also Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 82

(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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In a society that claims to be devoted to the ideas and practice of
democratic legitimacy, it is far from clear why the courts are the suitable
or appropriate institution to speak and act on the people's behalf. To put
it more pointedly, if the courts are assumed to have democratic legitimacy, then democratic legitimacy is a very thin device and counts for little
in the general political scheme of things. The courts are neither operated
nor constituted in line with popular will or representative viewpoints.
Indeed, the democratic legitimacy of the courts is somewhat perversely
grounded in their willingness to act as a check on popular and direct expressions of constituent power. 47 This seems to put democracy firmly
under the control of the constitution. At best, democracy is reduced to
merely one value in a much broader range of constitutional commitments.
III. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

It should be uncontroversial to conclude that formal amendment
processes, like Article V, and more informal practices of judicial interpretation do not sit at all well with a commitment to a strongly democratic approach to constitutional ordering. These mechanisms empower
narrow minorities (both political and judicial) with the right to veto any
proposal for change and disallow almost all forms of direct citizen participation. Democracy is brought under the disciplinary aegis of a strong
constitutionalism and is relegated to, at best, a secondary or fringe position in political engagement.
However, it is not clear that a constitution's amendment rule, no
matter how phrased or constructed, could be seen as creating a genuine
opening for constituent power to manifest itself; amendment rules, it may
be said, are precisely designed to prevent revolutions (democratic or otherwise) from taking place. As mentioned earlier, one of the main features
of a revolution, according to most analysis, is that it must involve the
overthrowing of the existing regime through a violation of the established rules of constitutional change. In other words, a revolution must
be accompanied or immediately followed by the coming into force of a
new Grundnorm.4 8 This approach creates several theoretical and democratic difficulties.
47.

Cf. BARRY FRIEDMAN,

THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS

INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).

Friedman has attempted to show that the Supreme Court of the United States has historically been
responsive to the views of the majority of the people. The point here, however, is not judicial responsiveness or non-responsiveness to the views of popular majorities (i.e., a dictator can be very
responsive to popular majorities as well), but the fact this mode of constitutional change allows nonelected officials to set aside decisions made by more democratic institutions.
The Grundnorm or basic norm, according to Kelsen, is the last presupposition upon which
48.
the validity of all the norms of a legal order depends; it postulates that "one ought to behave as the
individual, or the individuals, who laid down the first constitution have ordained". KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 115. When a revolution takes place, a new basic norm needs to
be presupposed. Id. at 118.
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First, as many critics of Kelsen's theory of revolution have pointed
out, new constitutional regimes are often born without the sort of legal
rupture that the Kelsenian approach requires. 49 For example, India
achieved its independence as a result of a set of events that can be characterized as revolutionary; however, there was arguably no legal rupture
with respect to the United Kingdom, who reluctantly passed the Indian
Independence Act in 1947 .o

Second, this view supposes that there is a fundamental incompatibility between a democratic constitution and revolutionary change. Under that perspective, there cannot be such a thing as a constitution that
presents itself as open for future democratic revolutions. That is to say,
regardless of how participatory and radical the relevant constitutional
change is, if it does not takes place through a violation of the established
constitutional order, it is not a revolution. This is not only a matter of
terminology, for it invites the type of approach to constitutional change
that characterizes the currently dominant conception of constitutionalism.
Constitutional change is thus seen as a special type of law-making, one
which is subject to stringer procedures but that is not to be associated
with, or attempt to facilitate, the exercise of constituent power. This approach sees democratic revolutions as something that happens to undemocratic or authoritarian constitutional arrangements, but that has no
place in a properly functioning constitutional state that governs with the
support and in the name of the people. Such a conception runs the risk of
betraying the very basis of a democratic revolution: a politically engaged
citizenry that gives itself a new constitution through the exercise of constituent power.
In a weakly democratic or non-democratic constitutional structure,
as that present in countries such as the United States and Syria, the exercise of constituent power would of course be non-constitutional, as it
would require a violation of the established amendment rules (which are
not characterized by creating meaningful and direct opportunities for
popular participation in constitutional change). But there is no reason
why all constitutional regimes have to be like that. Instead of looking at
constituent power and revolutions as a threat to a constitution that has
already achieved the desirable degree of democracy, constitutions should
approach revolutions and constituent power as offering opportunities for
correcting existing injustices through radical and participatory change. It
is in providing that possibility, where an important part of the democratic
legitimacy of a revolution and of the constitutional regime that it inaugu49. See, e.g., J. M. Finnis, Revolutions and the Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 44, 52-53 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973) (discussing this idea in the context of
Australia's independence); see PETER C. OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND 7-9

(2005).
50.

Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30, pmbl. (U.K.).
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rates rests. Instead of seeing as legitimate a regime that governs with the
consent or support of the people, democratic legitimacy is only consistent with a constitution that sees citizens as potential authors of a new
constitutional regime and that have the capacity of triggering future democratic revolutions.
As part of a practice of empowered democracy, there is a commitment to the institutional challenge of constructing and implementing a
practical set of constitutional arrangements that approximates to what
Roberto Unger has termed "the structure of no-structure."' This is the
effort to incorporate an element of perpetual revolution into a constitutional set-up. The ambition is not to do away with any constitution
(which seems as a hopeless and unachievable ideal anyway), but to develop a constitutional tradition that ensures that no legal institution is
immune to revision and transformation. In the attempt to diminish the
distance between structure-preserving routines and structuretransforming conflicts, "no hard-and-fast distinction separates criticism
and construction." 52 An integral dimension of such a political program of
strong democracy would be, among other things, a genuine attempt to
entitle citizens to challenge, de-stabilize, and disrupt established institutions and practices, including and especially the constitutional ones. This
would enable the closing of both an existential and institutional gap between ordinary and constitutional politics, between routine and radical
engagement, and between revolutionary and evolutionary change.
Understood in this way, a vigorous theory of democratic legitimacy
would be obliged to take the concept and practice of constituent power
seriously. Constituent power, according to its traditional formulation, is
not binding on itself. The problem, of course, is that the typical liberal
constitution treats constituent power as exhausted in the activity of establishing a new constitution. As such, the original power of the citizenry to
re-create their constitution through extraordinary procedures in which
popular involvement is at its highest and most meaningful is nowhere to
be found in the constitutions of the world's greatest revolutions. These
constitutions proceed as if the people relinquish its sovereignty after establishing a juridical order. Such a conception, even if it might symbolically appeal to "the people" every now and then, neutralizes popular sovereignty in actual political practice under the ideal of constitutional supremacy.
In contrast to this common and limited view of the relation between
democracy and constitutionalism, the democratic potential of the theory
of constituent power lies precisely in its insistence that the people's constitution-making power can be exercised at any moment after a constitu51.

(1987).
52.

ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 46

Id. at 143.
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tion is in place. This is in fact one of the major challenges that Sieyes and
Schmitt pose for the tradition of liberal constitutionalism.5 3 As has been
correctly noted, for them the "pouvoirconstituant remains a force to be
reckoned with well after the revolution."54 As showcased in the practical
operations of the American constitutional order, the constituent power
has not only been tamed and neutered, but it has been recast as an illegitimate force.
Accordingly, the democratic legitimacy of a revolution and of any
ensuing constitution is to be found as much in its openness to future exercises of constituent power as in its pedigree and the form of government it establishes. Thinking about constituent power in this way, as
being facilitated by a constitution, might appear contrary to some of its
defining features, such as its unmediated character and its irreducibility
to any pre-established legal forms. But this would be mistaken. A closer
look at the theory of constituent power shows that, while the constituent
power is to be construed as "independent of any procedures," 5 this does
not mean that a constitution may not facilitate its exercise by making
participatory constitutional change its preeminent and central feature. It
is true, of course, that constituent power cannot be limited or regulated
by any form or procedure; the bearer of the constituent power can give
life to a new constitutional order through any extra-constitutional
mechanism (as long as the mechanism is consistent with the very idea of
constituent power, that is to say, of a people giving itself a constitution).
However, it does not follow that constituent power cannot be exercised
through established procedures that attempt to come as close as possible
to a popular constitution-making episode or, what is the same thing, to a
democratic revolution.
In fact, Schmitt considered this possibility. He maintained that, even
though the initiation of constituent power could not be regulated by any
institution, the execution andformulation of the decisions of the constituent subject normally required certain organization and procedure.5 6 If
this were not the case, the constituent subject might remain in a state of
powerlessness and disorganization; it would be unable to transform its
will into law. In the absence of mechanisms that facilitate the execution
and formulation of the decisions of the constituent power, the success of
53. For Sieyes, "a nation can neither alienate nor waive its right to will; and whatever its
decisions, it cannot lose the right to alter them as soon as its interest requires." SIEYES, supra note 9,
at 127. Agreeing with Sieyes, Schmitt saw the exercise of constituent power as an ever present
possibility. The constituent power, he wrote, "is not thereby expended and eliminated, because it was
exercised once", but always "remains alongside and above the constitution." SCHMITT, supra note
11, at 125-26.
54.

William E. Scheuerman, Revolutions and Constitutions, in LAW AS POLITICS: CARL

SCHMITT'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 257 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998). Scheuerman is referring
here to specifically to Schmitt, but the point applies with the same force to Sieyes's conception.
55.

SIEYES, supra note 9, at 128.

56.

SCHMITT, supranote 11, at 132, 138, 140.
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a popular movement in producing important constitutional change depends on many-sometimes democratically irrelevant-factors such as
how effective is the state's repressive apparatus, how effective is a mass
political movement in persuading people to engage in different forms of
protest that might even involve the risk of death, how is the challenge to
the existing regime, and the regime itself, perceived by the international
community, etc. This helps to explain why in some countries (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt) the popular movements were successful in overthrowing
the existing regimes, while in other places (e.g., Bahrain and Syria) the
regimes in question have been able to survive for longer. 5 7
However, even in those places in which protestors were able to initiate the exercise of constituent power that ended in some sort of constitutional change, those changes were not adopted through participatory
processes. 58 Not surprisingly, those initiatives have been criticized for
failing to meet some of the main demands of the citizenry.59 In those
cases, to paraphrase Schmitt, the constituent power was not able to transform its proposals into law.60 It is exactly this desire to divert the future
exercise of constituent power into a constitutional blind alley that offends
the commitment to a mode of strong democratic governance.
III. CONCLUSION

The role of the democratic constitutional theorist, as well as that of
the revolutionary constitution-maker, should be to provide novel ways of
exercising the "right of revolution." 61 This will entail the continuing responsibility to devise institutional mechanisms that would allow constituent power to manifest and assert itself from time to time. Of course, the
exercise of constituent power would normally be initiated in the streets,
in the form of informal gatherings (as those now taking place in Greece
and Spain),6 2 civil disobedience, and other types of protests. However, a
truly democratic constitutional order would not only allow those types of
popular manifestations to occur without state interference, it would also
establish more formal and less complex processes which citizens could
57.

For a discussion of some of these events, see Tarek Masoud, The Upheavals in Egypt and

Tunisia: The Road to (andfrom) LiberationSquare, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, July 2011, at 20, and

Jason Gluck, Constitutional Reform in TransitionalStates: Challenges and Opportunities Facing
Egypt
and Tunisia, U.S.
INST.
OF PEACE,
PEACEBRIEF (April
29,
2011),
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB92.pdf.
For example, the constitutional changes recently approved in Egypt (via referendum) were
58.
drafted by a committee of experts appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Army
Council Issues Statement on ConstitutionalAmendments, EGYPT ST. INFO. SERVICE (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://www.sis.gov.eg/en/Story.aspx?sid=53903.
59. See, e.g., Gregg Carlstrom Deep Divisions Over Egypt's Referendum, AUAZEERA, (Mar.
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/anger-in-egypt/2011/03/
2011),
18,
20113159273349129.html.
60. See SCHMITT, supra note I1, at 132.
61.
FRIEDRICH, supra note 29, at 129.
62. Nicholas Kulish, Ethan Bronner & Jim Yardley, As Scorn for Vote Grows, ProtestsSurge
Around Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at Al.
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trigger and through which they could deliberate and decide on important
constitutional transformations. In other words, a constitutional mode of
democratic governance would promote rather than combat the occurrence of revolutions. The constitutional journey of democracy never
ends, but occasionally pauses for breath.

